By 
Introduction
Violent extremism and terrorism (VET) remain a major threat to global, regional, national, community and individual security. Over the past decade, the violent activities of terrorist groups have impacted on the stability of States in West Africa especially those in the Sahel and the coastal region. Despite the responses by States, regional and international bodies, VET has continued to escalate in complexity, scale and impact. Burkina Faso which stands at the junction between the Sahel and the coastal states was described by the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) as the most affected country worldwide in terms of deaths and attacks. In 2024, there was an increase of 2,197 terrorism-related and armed attack incidents in West Africa, as compared to 1,715 attacks reported in 2023, and 1601 attacks recorded in 2022 according to the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) National Early Warning System (NEWS). In the coastal region, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo have reported increased attacks on civilians and security personnel in their northern regions. Togo for example recorded 10 attacks resulting in 52 deaths in 2024, which accounted for 41 fatalities – up from 12 in 2023.
Although Ghana has not experienced any direct VET attacks, it faces several risk factors that increases its vulnerability to the threat. These include the country’s proximity to neighbouring countries like Togo and Burkina Faso which have active VET presence, porous borders, limited socioeconomic development in the border regions and influx of migrants fleeing from VE attacks in Burkina Faso and other part of the region. Aside these, Ghana is also arguably seen as a safe haven by VE elements and also to obtain relevant resources to support their operations. However, this has been debunked by the National Security Secretariat of Ghana. Nevertheless, recognising these risks and vulnerabilities, the government has implemented a national framework for preventing and responding to VET through security deployments, capacity building initiatives, awareness creation, intelligence sharing, inter-agency collaborations, community engagements among others. While these interventions have contributed to the relative success in the fight against VET, localising preventive efforts through existing community mechanisms has arguably been less visible and not leveraged to build resilience against the threat in the border areas. It is against this backdrop that this article explores how Ghana can localise its interventions to prevent VET using Community Watchdog Groups (CWGs) in the northern border communities. The article defines CWGs, highlights how they are formed and how they can support VET interventions, as well as the challenges and potential dangers of using such groups to serve as entry points for policy and practical interventions.
Community Watchdog Groups: Membership, Roles and Activities
Community Watchdog Groups are generally formed to enhance security surveillance in communities to reduce crime rates, fight insecurity and to promote community safety. They possess contextual knowledge of criminal behaviour, which allows them to detect and prevent crime and address local security needs. In several border communities in the Northern part of Ghana, CWGs have been established to enhance security and to support the efforts of the police to combat crime. These groups, called “Colwego” in the Upper East Region and “Kolibuor” in the Kokoligu area of the Upper West Region, are a response to the security needs of the communities. Traditional leaders, opinion leaders, and community members decide on their formation and assign defined roles and reporting channels to facilitate effective communication. They also mobilise the requisite resources like cutlasses and funds to support their work and motivate them. Members of the CWGs mainly consist of the youth and community members who are engaged mostly in hunting, trading, farming, fishing and other work along the borders. The number of CWG members vary among border communities. In Sapelliga in Upper East region, the CWG consist of 30 members, with a permanent tenure. In Kokoligu in the Upper West region, the “Kolibuor” comprised 20 members drawn from the four sections that make up the community. By convention, each section of the community presents five (5) volunteers as members of the “Kolibuor”. According to an Assembly member of the area, the group has no tenure, and its membership number keeps fluctuating due to the movement of some members to southern Ghana for work, educational and personal purposes. Similarly, CWGs in border areas in the Wa West District of the Upper West region do not have a specific number of members due to mobility of youth, especially migration to southern Ghana for greener pastures.
Community watchdog groups are organised with a leadership structure that coordinates the activities (patrols, monitoring of early warning signals, and awareness creation, etc.) of members and report to community leaders. In Sapelliga, the CWG has a Chairman, Secretary, Organiser, Operational Commander, Assistant Operational Commanders and Council of Elders. This organised leadership structure allows them to coordinate the activities of group members effectively, collaborate with other actors such as security agencies and similar CWGs on the other side of the border in Burkina Faso. Unlike the Colwego in Sapelliga, the Kolibuor of Kokoligu in the Upper West region does not have specific leadership portfolios. According to an Assembly Member, some members of the group coordinate with the Chief and Assembly Member of the area to counter threats and share information with security agencies. Aside the coordinating role, leaders of CWGs usually present suspicious actors or arrested crime suspects to the Chiefs/Community leaders before handing them over to the security agencies.
A notable quality of the CWG members is that they have a better understanding of the border terrain and can easily identify suspicious activities and individuals for early response. In the Wa West District of the Upper West region, CWGs have in the past detected, identified and reported suspicious actors who attempted to cross the black Volta to the assembly and unit committee members who in turn report to the Chiefs and security agencies for response. Except for the “Kolibuor” in Kokoligu community of the Upper West region, the CWGs in many border areas often exclude women because they perceive them as vulnerable and cannot withstand violent confrontations. However, an assembly member in the Kokoligu area explained that women are included in the Kolibuor because they believe that “what men can do, women can do it better”, suggesting that women have agency to contribute to community peace and security. Most of the CWGs in the border areas enjoy some form of legitimacy as they enjoy some form of cooperation, support, and recognition from community members and state actors.
CWGs as a harbinger of Community-Led Counter-Extremism Response
Following the increasing threat of VET in neighbouring Burkina Faso, CWGs have been at the forefront of safeguarding the safety and security of their communities along the borders. They engage in several activities to prevent VET including keeping vigilance, monitoring and reporting early warning signals, combating criminal activities, sensitising and creating awareness among community members.
Providing early warning information: CWGs patrol the borders with Burkina Faso especially where the presence of the state is limited as well monitor suspicious movements to prevent VE elements from entering their communities. The lack of vigilance is a major reason why extremists enter certain territories without detection, stoppage, or arrest. In view of this, CWGs in Sapelliga and Zebilla in the Upper East region and Hamile, Lawra and Wa West in the Upper West region have served as guardians at the border, detecting, arresting, and interrogating suspicious individuals before handing them over to state security forces. They use motorbikes for patrols and mobile phones to communicate, update, and provide situational reports to their leaders who in turn report to security agencies for prompt response to any early warning signs. Likewise, CWGs in border communities along the black Volta in Wa West also use canoes to patrol and gather early warning information.
Sensitisation and awareness creation: As the experiences of countries in the Sahel shows, VET thrives on ignorance of the population. Past research by the Ghana National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) has also confirmed that most of the population in the border areas lack adequate knowledge about VET. Therefore, one of the primary roles of CWGs has been the sensitization and awareness creation of community members to enlighten them about the tactics, ideologies and dangers of VET activities. They educate community members on the national “see something, say something” campaigns to prevent VET and encourage residents to report any suspicious activity or movement of persons in the community to them for redress.
Combatting Criminality: CWGs are complimenting the efforts the security agencies to prevent crimes like thievery, armed robbery, drug and arms trafficking and smuggling of goods to prevent VE elements from using them to fund their activities. A typical example is how communities along the black Volta in Lawra Municipality, Wa West District and Kokoligu areas in Nandom Municipality in the Upper West region stop and search individuals using their communities to exit or enter Ghana to prevent them from engaging in or facilitating organised crime. CWGs also work with security officers to man unapproved routes to stop and search anyone exiting or entering Ghana to prevent smuggling of fuel or other materials that may benefit VE groups. In the Nandom municipality, CWGs have been assisting in combating galamsey (illegal mining) activities along the borders. Local political authorities recognise that such galamsey sites could attract VE elements as avenues to obtain financial and other resources to strengthen their activities.
Collaborating with other Actors
The CWGs do not work in isolations. They cooperate with different actors in the performance of their roles. Community watchdog groups collaborate with border security services, including police, military, Immigration, Customs, and Narcotics, to navigate border terrain and identify unapproved routes for entry or exit. They monitor early warning signals, work with chiefs, assembly members, and unit committees to raise awareness about VE. The Watchdog groups also have external networks, like Colwego in Burkina Faso, which helps in the sharing of VE-related information especially movement of suspicious elements in their communities. These groups work together to create awareness about VE to protect their communities.
The CWGs in border communities, such as Sapelliga, Lawra, Wa West and Nandom, for example assist the Ghana Immigration Service to profile migrants fleeing extremist violence in Burkina Faso by leveraging their cultural, linguistic, and family ties between the two countries. Some security officers in Lawra and Wa West revealed that some border community members host strangers from Burkina Faso without reporting to them. In view this, CWGs also collaborate with community members to verify the identity of Burkina Faso residents staying with any community member. During the interviews in Lawra, it was indicated that any person from Burkina Faso who is hosted by a community is interrogated and evicted when found to have no family ties with the host.
Challenges and Potential Dangers
Community watchdog groups face several challenges including the inadequate logistics, training, corrupt security officials, and lack of remuneration which hinder their optimal performance. Some security officers in border communities such as Hamile in the Upper West Region alleged that their colleagues take money from people entering or exiting border communities without conducting necessary checks. This leads to scrupulous actors preferring routes manned by corrupt security officials than CWGs to avoid seizure of illicit items. Moreover, they also lack appropriate logistics, such as transportation and protective gear, and financial motivation, which tends to lower their morale. However, in some communities like Kokoligu, a community member indicated that watchdog groups are sometimes given money (about Ghc50.00) once a while to buy fuel for patrols. Similarly, some assembly and unit committee members in border communities in the Wa West District indicated that any time they visit watchdog groups manning areas along the black volta they give them small amount of money (either Ghc20.00 or Ghc30.00 or Ghc50.00) as a form of motivation.
Furthermore, CWGs lack adequate training on community policing, security, arrests, and early warning monitoring and response, which affect the quality of information gathered and the swiftness of VE-related information sharing and response. Apart from the Sapelliga’s watchdog group which has received some support and training on early warning and response from the United Nations Development Programme, Ghana and the National Peace Council, similar groups in border areas like Wa West, Lawra and Kokoligu areas in the Upper West Region are not trained and equipped. As a result, they sometimes spread rumors and unverified information about movement of VE elements towards their communities, which tends to be false, creating intense fears and panic.
The reliance on CWGs could also come at a cost because they are largely not formally regulated and monitored. Aside the oversight provided by the traditional authorities and ad hoc collaboration with security agencies, there is no formal operational guidelines in terms of how they operate. As a result, members of the CWDs sometimes punish individuals arrested for crimes, thereby turning themselves into a court or parrel security. It is therefore challenging to deal with their excesses and human right abuses of suspected criminals
Besides, CWGs are reportedly trusted more than state security by some community members in border areas. According to a security officer interviewed, trust deficit in state security in border areas has undermined the collective efforts to prevent VET due to the unwillingness of some community members to report or share information. While the trust in CWGs is commendable, it risks parallel security structures, vigilantism and further erosion of the legitimacy of law enforcement agencies. In addition, the lack of protection equipment and mechanisms for CWGs discourages many young people from volunteering to join the group. For instance, youth in Banapama community are unwilling to volunteer as members of the CWG community watchdog group due to lack of life jackets to protect them from drowning when patrolling the black Volta and fear of being killed by VE elements.
Empowering CWGs as Community Resilience against VET
Community watchdog groups act as resilience agents and sentinels in border communities. They apply their local knowledge, trust networks and social capital to engage in informal surveillance, gather early warning information and collaborate with other actors to prevent VET. They work with the security agencies to combat criminal activities in border areas. However, the lack of training, logistics and regulation and the activities of some corrupt security officials constrain their contributions to prevent VET. Their adaptive capacity, combined with their presence in spaces where state presence is limited make them critical tools for strengthening Ghana’s early warning systems and VET preventive efforts . Also, their legitimacy and effectiveness are rooted in their social proximity, cultural embeddedness and relational trust in communities. The contributions of CWGs highlights the importance of implementing a hybrid security governance model or approach in preventing VET in border areas.
It is imperative therefore that CWGs are supported, empowered and trained by government through the Police to provide proactive, community-driven solutions and community resilience against VET. It is also vital to train and support CWGs on how to verify information before they “say something” to prevent the sharing of unverified information that tend to cause fear in communities. Furthermore, the Police needs to continuously monitor and engage CWGs to prevent them from transforming themselves into parrel security or court and meting out punishment to arrested suspects. It is imperative to also foster trust between members of border communities and state security to increase the willingness of community members to report or share early warning information for prompt response.
Authors
Chrispin Mwinkyogtaa Kuupiel
REcAP Mentee, WANEP & Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Peace Studies, School of Development Studies, University of Cape Coast, Ghana
Dr. Festus Kofi Aubyn
Regional Coordinator, Research and Capacity Building, WANEP
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