Civil Society Engagement with Ghana’s National Security Strategy (NSS)

Introduction

Ghana’s adoption of a National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2020 marked a historic step in the country’s security governance. The NSS consolidated Ghana’s fragmented policy initiatives on national security into one integrated, comprehensive and coherent framework to address wide range of security threats, including violent extremism, cybercrime, chieftaincy disputes, election-related violence, climate insecurity and socio-economic insecurities such as unemployment. Importantly, the strategy acknowledged that security is not only about protecting the state from external threats but also about ensuring the wellbeing and safety of citizens. Hence, it provided for a people-centric human security response approach to Ghana’s national security in line with Article 1(1) of the 1992 Constitution which states that “The Sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised in the manner and within the limits laid down in this Constitution.” While the shift toward human security was widely welcomed, questions remain about how inclusive, transparent, and accountable its implementation has been. Civil society organisations (CSOs) stand at the centre of these debates, both as partners in building peace and as watchdogs holding state institutions to account. This article highlights CSOs perceptions and contributions to the implementation of the National Security Strategy and identifies gaps in policy implementation and public accountability.

Ghana’s National Security Strategy and Civil Society Organisations

The role of CSOs (including women and youth groups) in the NSS is captured under Chapter four, which covers “Safeguarding National Cohesion for Peace and Stability.” Their role in the NSS is framed within the framework of the whole-of society approach to ensure effective implementation and comprehensive responses to the multitude of threats confronting the country.

CSOs are expected to partner with the Government to undertake the following key roles to preserve the peace and security of the country:

• Pivotal role in early warning and response framework to provide ground monitoring, collection and analysis of data to be fed into the national security early warning system;
• Advocacy on the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) to raise public awareness of the associated dangers;
• Lead role or participant in peace talks in settling conflicts or disputes within the country. CSOs are expected to help create the right conditions for talks, build confidence, shape the conduct of the content of negotiations and influence the sustainability of agreements in conflict and dispute areas in the country;
• Promote reconciliation in post conflict situations. Enhance local ownership of peacebuilding initiatives and contribute towards democratisation processes; and
• Work closely with the Ministry of National Security, National Peace Council and the Houses of Chiefs in implementing conflict prevention mechanisms. Serve as a credible bridge between Government and civil society as part of measures to promote national unity and cohesion.

While these are important contributions CSOs were expected to make, the question remains as to whether they have been effectively involved in the implementation of the strategy to provide wider societal accountability.

 Civil Society Organisations Perspectives on the National Security Strategy  

From the perspective of Ghanaian CSOs, the NSS represents a milestone achievement, serving as the blueprint for coordinating holistic national response efforts to protect and safeguard national sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic prosperity and the safety of citizens.  The NSS demonstrates the state’s recognition that security is interconnected with justice, social equity, and development. CSOs generally appreciate the document’s holistic framing of security to encompass both traditional and emerging challenges like terrorism, cyber security, climate change, economic instability, and gender-based violence as well as its preventive orientation.

However, the perceptions are not uniformly positive. Many CSOs hold the view that the consultation process leading up to the development of the NSS was limited and selective, leaving women’s organisations, youth groups, and grassroots actors under-represented. Therefore, although the people are the ultimate beneficiaries of the NSS, public awareness of the strategy and its implementation has been low. This has led to a weaker sense of ownership and implementation by CSOs.

There is also the concern that if the security sector is not held accountable, aspects of the NSS, particularly those related to information control, surveillance, and public order, could be interpreted or applied in ways that curtail legitimate civic activism or media freedom. These concerns stem from incidents that reflects growing securitisation of the civic space in Ghana. For example, the 2023 State of the Ghanaian Media Report established that state security actors were among top perpetrators of violence against journalists. This is not limited to incidents of arbitrary arrests of journalists and protesters but also includes military deployment in civilian communities during elections. Similarly, in 2020, there were reports of intimidation of citizens following the deployment of the military by government to border regions including the Volta Region on the grounds of national security concerns and efforts to curb the spread of COVID-19. This illustrates how securitised state security interventions, especially around elections, can threaten democratic processes when oversight is weak, underscoring the need to anchor state security in the rule-of-law to protect civil liberties.

Equally concerning is the low level of public awareness of the NSS as most Ghanaians and CSOs  are not familiar of its existence, what their roles are, how it shapes security governance and how they can demand accountability from the responsible implementing agencies. This situation partly explains why CSOs advocacy on the effective implementation and review of the NSS has been limited even though the mandatory review period has elapsed. In other words, the NSS is supposed to be reviewed every four years after its adoption in 2020, but no concrete action has been undertaken by the government. The Ministry of National Security which was the lead agency responsible for the implementation and coordination of the implementing actors of the NSS has also been collapsed by the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) government. However, there is hardly any robust public discussions of these matters by CSOs to influence the government to take immediate action on the review process of the NSS.

CSOs Contributions to the NSS Implementation

Although CSOs are expected to be major contributors to the NSS implementation through a “whole-of-society” approach, there is a lack of a well structured, formal mechanism to ensure their efforts are well-coordinated and integrated into the overall framework. In the absence of this formalised mechanism, CSOs in Ghana have indirectly contributed to the NSS implementation through their interventions and programmes to respond to the multitude of threats confronting the country. Since its adoption, organisations such as the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA) has championed advocacy on strengthening regulations on arms control while COGINTA has been organizing workshops to improve community policing and awareness in preventing violent extremism. Similarly, the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) works to promote peacebuilding, social cohesion, and resilience among communities.

Other organisations such as West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), CDD-Ghana, and the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) have worked to ensure that security governance is people-centered. They have among others consistently monitored election-related security challenges and provided real-time reporting that builds trust and deters violence. CDD-Ghana for example continues to produce independent research and scorecards that inform debates on governance accountability. WANEP, National Peace Council, and other CSOs have also facilitated dialogue and mediation processes in communities vulnerable to violent extremism and local conflicts, while MFWA has promoted media freedom, exposed attacks against journalists and implemented programmes to address the increasing threats of misinformation and disinformation on social media. In addition, West Africa Centre for Counter-Extremism (WACCE) has worked to deepen awareness around violent extremism through Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) workshops, helped national security actors to track radicalized individuals and has lead the review of the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) in various regions nationwide. Similarly, STAR-Ghana Foundation has embarked on sensitization campaign to increase awareness about the existence of the NSS. It also design and implement initiative to address the root causes of conflicts, insecurity and underdevelopment.

Importantly, CSOs, faith-based organisations, and media actors have been at the forefront of national campaigns against illegal mining (galamsey), highlighting its devastating impact on water security, agriculture, public health, and local conflict dynamics. Research institutions and advocacy groups have consistently called for stronger governance of natural resources and accountability in enforcement measures. CSOs like WANEP have also provided expert advise and security briefings on national security issues to key national institutions based on their research findings, knowledge and grassroots work. These contributions demonstrate that CSOs are not merely observers but active co-producers of security outcomes in Ghana.

Gaps in Policy Implementation and Accountability

There are clear gaps in the NSS implementation and accountability. Transparency remains limited as progress reports on NSS implementation are not routinely published, making it difficult for CSOs and the public to track achievements or failures. National security operations are not transparent about mechanisms for assessing the implementation, budget allocations, spending and performance of the sector. Engagement with CSOs tends to be ad hoc and personality-driven, lacking formal structures to ensure continuity.

Parliamentary oversight, through committees on Defense and Interior or Public Accounts, is constrained by capacity and access to data. Sometimes, the Intelligence Agencies Act of 2020 is invoked to prevent Parliament from seeking accountability or audit of national security budget or spending. Grassroots groups, women’s organisations, and border communities are often excluded from national-level monitoring. In the case of illegal mining or galamsey, CSOs have frequently noted weak enforcement, political patronage, and limited consultation with affected communities, all of which undermine the credibility of government interventions.

Additionally, whilst the poor and sometimes distrustful relationship between CSOs and National Security predates the NSS, its implementation has not changed much of this reality. Human rights abuses by various security actors including the military, police and National Security operatives have helped to project an adversarial relationship between the two entities. Indeed, hostile and intimidating conduct of some National Security actors against some CSOs and journalists continue to undermine goodwill required to enhance collaboration. This requires addressing to ensure effective operationalization of the NSS in the security interest of Ghana.

Finally, CSOs oversight responsibility in implementing the NSS has been weak partly because most CSOs are not familiar with the strategy, possibly due to its poor dissemination and their limited involvement in the formulation. CSOs are also either not interested because of donor priorities or not aware of the implementation progress due to the culture of security within the Ghanain security services – making reports inaccessible.

 Final Reflections and Proposed Actions

Ghana’s NSS is a groundbreaking document, but its vision and objectives will only be fully fulfilled if it is implemented transparently and inclusively. Civil society should not be seen solely as a watchdog but also as a strategic partner in safeguarding the national interest. By co-producing and co-managing security  solutions with the state, CSOs can help ensure that Ghana’s security architecture remains resilient, accountable, and firmly grounded in the everyday needs of its people. This collaborative, people-centered approach is what will ultimately strengthen both national stability and democratic governance. Moving forward, several steps could be taken to strengthen civil society engagement with the NSS.

First, the National Security Secretariat should consider institutionalising a formal CSO–National security Forum, co-convened by the National Security Secretariat (as the Ministry of National Security has been collapsed), the National Peace Council, and a representative CSO platform, to meet bi-annually or quarterly to review national security trends and responses.  The risks of inaction are clear. Without structured engagement, civil society’s role will remain tokenistic, and citizens will continue to view the NSS as a distant, elite-driven document. Conversely, meaningful collaboration through the proposed CSO–National security Forum can transform the NSS into a living framework that citizens recognise and trust, which can also help demystify national security, build public confidence, and foster accountability.

Second, it is important for the government to invlove CSOs at all levels in the consultations for the review of the NSS which is long overdue in order for them to own the document for effective implementation.  Third, the National Security Secretariat is encouraged to publish a quarterly or bi-annual NSS implementation bulletin, outlining progress, upcoming priorities, and contact points to enhance transparency and allow CSOs to engage and align their work with national priorities.

Fourth, the parliamentary committee on Defence and Interior should consider holding a structured briefing session with CSOs ahead of the presentation of the progress report of the NSS implementation to integrate independent evidence into oversight functions. Fifth, the National Security Secretariat should consider setting up a CSO desk at the national, regional and district levels to cultivate a stronger positive collaboration between CSOs and National Security.

Anthony Caid Gbemapu, Research Intern, WANEP.

AUTHORS       Chrispin Mwinkyogtaa Kuupiel Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Peace Studies, School of Development Studies University of Cape Coast, Ghana

Dr. Festus Kofi Aubyn Regional Coordinator Research and Capacity Building WANEP-Regional

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of WANEP. While every attempt has been made to ensure that the information published is accurate, no responsibility or liability is accepted for any loss, damage or disruptions caused by errors or omissions whether such errors or omissions result from negligence, or any other cause.