{"id":10022,"date":"2025-09-22T12:40:54","date_gmt":"2025-09-22T12:40:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wanep.org\/wanep\/?p=10022"},"modified":"2025-09-22T12:42:41","modified_gmt":"2025-09-22T12:42:41","slug":"expanding-internet-access-ghanas-connectivity-and-extremist-propaganda","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/wanep.org\/wanep\/expanding-internet-access-ghanas-connectivity-and-extremist-propaganda\/","title":{"rendered":"Expanding Internet Access: Ghana’s Connectivity and Extremist Propaganda"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Over the past decade, Ghana has made significant progress in digital connectivity. The 2024 Mobile Connectivity Index<\/a> indicates that 56.9 percent of Ghana\u2019s population had access to the internet, compared with 37.2 percent for Mali, 35.3 percent for Burkina Faso, and 27.4 percent for Niger. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, between 2014 and 2024, Ghana’s internet connectivity increased<\/a> from 35.4% to 56.9%, representing an improvement of 21.5 percentage points. This translates to a 60.7% relative increase<\/a> over the ten-year period \u2013 higher than the gains recorded in Mali (15.0 points), Burkina Faso (12.8 points), and Niger (12.4 points). As of January 2025, around 24.3 million Ghanaians<\/a> were internet users, accounting for approximately 69.9\u202f% of the national population. Similarly, Ghana had 38.3 million<\/a> mobile cellular connections for services like calls, texts, and internet. As the number of users and devices continues to increase, the speed and quality of connections are also improving \u2013 with 93.4%<\/a> of mobile connections in Ghana now classified as \u2018broadband\u2019, meaning they operate on 3G, 4G, or 5G networks. With the expansion of mobile networks, increasing urbanization, and widespread use of affordable smartphones, more Ghanaians \u2013 especially young people, are actively engaging in the digital space.<\/p>\n

Figure 1: Percentage of Population with Internet Access
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Globally, there were 5.31 billion<\/a> social media user identities as of April 2025 \u2013 roughly 64.7\u202f% of the world\u2019s population. As of January 2025, the number of active social media user identities in Ghana stood at about 7.95 million<\/a>, representing around 22.9\u202f% of the population, or 32.7\u202f% of all internet users. Youth are the most active online demographic, engaging with digital content for entertainment, politics, religion, sports among others. Platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube dominate the digital landscape in Ghana. These services enable users to connect, express themselves, and access information. This development has created new avenues for learning, entrepreneurship, civic participation, and social connection.<\/p>\n

While this indicates increased digital empowerment, it also exposes users, especially youth to misinformation, hate speech, and in some instances, extremist content. Terrorists exploit these same spaces to push narratives around injustice, religious duty, or resistance.\u00a0 Extremist groups across West Africa such as Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama\u2019at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) are leveraging social media<\/a> and messaging platforms to promote violence, recruit followers, and spread radical ideologies. While Ghana has not yet experienced the scale of online radicalization seen in parts of the Sahel, its rising digital exposure and youthful population, coupled with socio-economic pressures, creates conditions of vulnerability. Consequently, in September 2021, the National Security of Ghana arrested 33<\/a> suspects at Nambahala, in the Northern Region who were believed to have links with terrorist organizations in Burkina Faso and Mali. However, a key concern is the limited digital literacy among many users, inhibiting their ability to evaluate content credibility and recognizing manipulative messaging. The limited public understanding<\/a> of the drivers, strategies, and implications of online terrorism, coupled with the country\u2019s history of protracted chieftaincy conflicts, and geographic proximity to volatile neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso, underscore the urgency for awareness and preventive policy measures.<\/p>\n

This article explores the intersection between Ghana\u2019s expanding digital access and the evolving threat of extremist propaganda online and how extremist groups exploit digital platforms to radicalize and recruit young people. It also highlights government and civil society responses and provides pragmatic recommendations for key stakeholders to build more resilient and secure digital environment.<\/p>\n

Extremist Messaging and Online Strategy<\/strong><\/p>\n

Extremist groups operating in the Sahel and other parts of West Africa such as the ISWAP and JNIM are increasingly leveraging digital platforms<\/a> as key tools to spread their ideology, justify violence, and recruit followers. These organizations exploit poor digital literacy, socio-political grievances, and economic marginalization particularly among the youth, to extend their influence beyond conflict zones. They disseminate their propaganda through both encrypted applications like Telegram and WhatsApp and more open platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram. These platforms are a go-to because<\/a> of their massive youth user base, low barriers to content creation, and powerful algorithms that can amplify sensational or emotionally charged content.<\/p>\n

The content shared by these groups is often strategically crafted to evoke feelings of injustice, abandonment, and religious duty. The narratives typically emphasize government corruption, state failure, and the promise of dignity, belonging, or divine reward through resistance. Research by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR)<\/a> shows that extremist media increasingly mimics the aesthetics of mainstream content by using high-resolution videos, drone footage, nasheeds (Islamic chants), and even storytelling formats that appeal to younger audiences online.<\/p>\n

Figure 2: Extremist Groups\u2019 Modus Operandi
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\nSource: Authors<\/p>\n

From Figure 2 above, extremist propaganda ecosystem operates on two interlinked levels: global and local. Extremist organizations targeting global audience<\/a> produce highly polished content in Arabic, French, and English to reach a dispersed international audience. Locally, they target specific linguistic and cultural communities using Fulfulde, Hausa, Bambara, and other regional languages. These grassroots campaigns often use low-budget videos, audio sermons, and PDF leaflets circulated through informal networks like WhatsApp groups, making detection and counter-messaging difficult due to linguistic diversity and community-level buy-in<\/a> of such propagandas. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) stands out for its advanced digital strategy. Unlike Boko Haram or al-Shabaab, ISIL<\/a> operates across a wider array of platforms including Facebook, Twitter (X), YouTube, WhatsApp, and Telegram. While Twitter was initially their preferred channel, the group shifted to Telegram and dark web as platform moderation intensified. By 2022, ISWAP<\/a> was reportedly operating more than fifty (50) Telegram and Facebook accounts to coordinate their dissemination and recruitment agenda.<\/p>\n

The terrorist groups often structure their online networks<\/a> like digital ecosystems: with \u2018educators\u2019 who promote ideology, \u2018motivators\u2019 who inspire violence, and \u2018flamers\u2019 who provoke hostility and encourage fundraising. Such decentralised models help them to sustain their movements by adapting quickly to shutdowns or censorship. The spread of extremist content online has been likened to epidemiological contagion, where algorithm amplification allows messages to go viral within niche communities, increasing visibility and engagement exponentially. Although Ghana has not experienced the same intensity of digital radicalization as some neighbouring states like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the growing threat<\/a> is concerning as the drivers of radicalization already exist.<\/p>\n

Ghanaian Youth: Victims or Perpetrators of Radicalization? <\/strong><\/p>\n

In a 2023 UNDP assessment<\/a>, youth unemployment was the leading driver of vulnerability to violent extremism in northern Ghana as national unemployment rate among 15\u201324-year-olds was 32.8%, with Upper East at 39%, Savannah at 38.2%, and North East at 34.7%. Online extremist recruiters continue to target vulnerable youth, particularly those battling with poor job prospects, limited education, and social exclusion in Ghana\u2019s northern regions, which are also geographically close to extremist zones. Many near-recruit victims<\/a> report first coming across extremist ideas through social media or messaging apps, where they were drawn in gradually \u2013 beginning with general religious or political content before progressing to more radical messages.\u00a0 Amin<\/a>, a 21-year-old senior high school graduate from the northern region of Ghana recounted nearly joining IS after he was contacted online by an Algerian recruiter.<\/p>\n

Extremist groups are exploiting digital platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube to reach Ghanaian youth with propaganda that frames injustice, religious obligation, and social identity narratives. A 2017 UNDP-RAND report<\/a> identified these platforms as key venues for radicalization across Africa. Illustration in Figure 3 below highlights some cases recorded over the years in Ghana and beyond, involving Ghanaian youth. \u00a0In 2015, Mohammad Nazir Nortei Alema, a 25-year-old geography graduate from the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), joined and \u00a0confirmed his allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) after being radicalized online<\/a>. His case shocked the nation and underscored the dangerous appeal of online propaganda, even to the educated youth.<\/p>\n

Similarly, security analysts reported that over two hundred (200) Ghanaians from northern regions have been recruited into extremist group affiliates<\/a> such as the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) since 2015, often returning as religious propagators in their local communities.\u00a0 In June 2021, Abu Dujana, Ghanaian, carried out a suicide bombing<\/a> near a French camp in Mali for JNIM, after urging an uprising against the Ghanaian government in a recorded video.<\/p>\n

Figure 3: Case Highlights
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\nSource: Authors<\/p>\n

The terrorist groups also leverage Artificial Intelligence (AI) automation to spread media contents in their radicalization and recruitment agenda. Beyond direct recruitment, algorithms<\/a> on social media platforms may inadvertently promote extremist content with ideological inclinations to users. This algorithmic reinforcement, coupled with emotional vulnerability, poses risks to youth lacking digital literacy. On the positive side, early prevention efforts have yielded tangible results. The West Africa Centre for Counter-Extremism (WACCE) in Ghana reported rescuing<\/a> at least twenty (20) Ghanaian youth from joining IS fighters, many of whom were radicalized online.<\/p>\n

Ghana\u2019s Response to Online Radicalization<\/strong><\/p>\n

Government Measures<\/strong><\/p>\n

The government through the mandated state institutions and agencies, has undertaken various initiatives to prevent and respond to online radicalizations. Some of these initiatives are highlighted below:<\/p>\n